The problem for the old diplomacy is that once the war got started, it was hard to pursue anything approaching a sensible negotiating strategy to end it, despite the fact that there was probably more in common between states than ever before. The old dictum from Clausewitz was turned on its head—politics became merely an extension of the war. There is a profound irony here. Total war, as it emerged during the First World War, was in part the product of having to mobilize the resources of increasingly complex industrial societies to feed the literal and figurative war machine.
That mobilization developed a terrible momentum all its own. Even if the belligerent states were not democracies in any modern sense, they had to appeal to the broad mass of the people to get them to make the sacrifices necessary to keep such a conflict going.
Once the people were included in the discussion, because the states need the people to fight and work and generally behave themselves, governments ran into the problem of managing public opinion once the war had begun. It may not be easy to get the people to embrace war, but once mobilized, how do you de-escalate? A Century of Peace? Even considering the many dynastic rivalries, nationalist discontents, domestic political challenges, and military-technological advances that in retrospect, at least made Europe appear a powder keg before Sarajevo, it took a special combination of circumstances to lead to war in Even though previous crises had led to negotiations, this time, no one appeared prepared to negotiate.
Or, rather, they all appeared to count on someone else to show the restraint they were themselves not prepared to display. Despite differences between Austrians and Hungarians, Vienna decided they had nothing to gain from negotiation, and welcomed a chance to humble Serbia with an ultimatum the Serbs would be unable to accept.
They hoped, however, to keep the war limited. German support made Austria unwilling to negotiate even when the Serbs offered a weak response to ultimatum. This in turn pulled in the Russians, still smarting from their failure to support Serbia over Bosnia in , and who did not want to see their Pan-Slavic credentials further undermined. France welcomed the chance for the reckoning they had sought for a generation. Only Britain appears to have seriously wrestled with the possibility of negotiations to defuse the crisis, though that did not last very long once German troops crossed the Belgian frontier.
There is the rub. Whatever possibilities existed for negotiations were undermined by the tyranny of military planning. Even if recent scholars have cast doubt on whether such a well-formulated Schlieffen Plan existed, enormous resources had been devoted on all sides to war planning and the intricacies of mobilization. Once the crisis set the clock running, the tempting objectivity of timetables placed enormous pressure on decision makers to allow events to take their course, limiting their options.
Military planning promised rational objectivity, removing the subjectivity of individual decision makers. In that sense, the war was both a defeat for humanity and a triumph for rational modernity. Although scholars such as Arno Mayer have long noted the Persistence of the Old Regime in the continued power of aristocratic elites in 20 th Century Europe, the outbreak of the war proved how weak that old order actually was. The old order had been based on a vague consensus that decisions rested with the people at the top.
Ultimate decisions of war and peace lay not with the monarchs, but with their military professionals. As their nations geared up for war, the two cousins proclaimed their desire for peace and chided each other for not having better control over their generals and diplomats, even as both complained that no one on their side listened to them. Cabinet wars could be ended by agreements between monarchs; modern total war could ignore the will of monarchs altogether.
Such is the ambivalence of progress. Once the war got underway, what little diplomatic or political imagination either side possessed was devoted to the search for allies. The rush to gain allies only widened the war, and no one outside of the conflict could get the belligerents to stop.
The Germans successfully courted the Ottomans and Bulgarians, while Britain and France used territorial inducements to win over the Italians with the Treaty of London in The promises were kept secret, however. Their exposure later on would embarrass the Allied cause by revealing the cynical territorial horse-trading behind their emphasis on self-determination.
Wilson and the United States played a complicated role in this political dance. The Americans emphasized neutral rights at sea, though the British blockade kept Americans from trading with the Central Powers, thus gradually encouraging an American tilt toward the Allies. All the while, the war continued grinding onward, even as the geopolitical point of the slaughter became harder to see through the fog of poison gas and the smoke of incessant artillery barrages.
The finest scientific and managerial minds continued to perfect the technology of death, while political solutions receded into the mist. By at the latest the war had lost any connection to coherent and sensible political platforms.
It made sense that someone should have tried to end it. The belligerents, however, showed little initiative. Even worse, when the last efforts in this direction came from the Vatican, Washington, and Vienna, the belligerents devoted their efforts to undermining them.
Pope Benedict XV, in an effort to live up to his job description, called for a peace conference in , and offered a more detailed peace plan in August For his troubles, he was denounced by both French and German Catholics, and retreated back into the silence of the Vatican. Woodrow Wilson also speculated with the possibility of mediation, but had no luck.
Unofficial efforts by his adviser Col. Edward House had proven both unavailing and politically embarrassing. Woodrow Wilson attempted to change the world by promoting such principles as self-determination, disarmament, and the cooperation of nations to preserve the peace.
Although Wilson received the Nobel Peace Prize in , most Americans turned back to the isolationist attitude that the U. This sentiment prevailed until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in Although Wilson died in , his reputation revived during the Second World War.
Many believed that if the U. President Franklin D. After the war, the U. Yet even during this period, elements of Wilsonianism survived. One example was the Helsinki Accords, signed by 35 nations, including the U. In this document, countries promised to respect the borders created at the end of World War II.
After the fall of the Soviet Union in , Wilsonianism surfaced again. People in almost every part of the world wanted democracy, free trade, a ban on the spread of nuclear weapons, and an effective United Nations. President George W. Bush promoted a foreign policy to make America safe by extending democracy to those who do not yet enjoy it. Do you agree or disagree with his view? Why do you think Wilson failed in his fight for the U. Do you think President George W.
Use evidence from the article to support your answer. Do you think U. Dawley, Alan. Princeton, N. PBS Online, Each group should read and discuss Points 1—5 and Point For each point, the group should discuss and answer these questions:. Alumni Volunteers The Boardroom Alumni. Curriculum Materials.
Add Event. Main Menu Home. In the last of his Fourteen Points, Wilson returned to his dream for an international organization for world peace: But to Wilson, the most important purpose of the League was stated in the opening words of the Covenant: The High Contracting Parties, In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war.
The covenant created new mechanisms to maintain permanent world peace, including: An Executive Council, consisting of five big powers and four smaller ones, to decide questions of war and peace by a unanimous vote. The authority for the Executive Council to order economic penalties and to recommend necessary military means against a war-making nation.
A pledge by member nations to reduce armaments to a level necessary only to preserve order within their borders. A Permanent Court of International Justice to settle disputes between nations. For Discussion and Writing 1. For Further Reading Dawley, Alan. Divide the class into small groups. For each point, the group should discuss and answer these questions: a.
What does it mean? Is it relevant today? Why or why not? Should it be part of international law today? Many in the Republican-controlled Senate opposed significant parts of the treaty.
After his major stroke, Wilson was unable to win approval of his peace settlement. While the League was doomed to fail without active U. Close Search Search. The Ongoing Plight of Afghan Refugees. December 1, Explore More. Previous Next. Opinion: What we need to learn from the U.
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